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INTRODUCTION
Rational choice approaches to politics did not
originate in the study of the European Union
(EU),nor is ‘rational choice’as such a theory of
European integration or of EU politics.
1
Rational choice, like constructivism, should be
understood as a broad approach to social
theory, capable of generating an array of spe-
cific theories and testable hypotheses about a
range of human behaviors. Over the past two
decades, rational choice theories have made
rapid inroads into the study of EU politics,
most notably through the application of ratio-
nal choice institutionalism to the study of EU
decision-making. In this Chapter, I provide a
brief introduction to rational choice theory,
examine the application of rational choice
analyses to EU politics, assess the empirical
fruitfulness of such analyses and identify both
internal and external challenges to the rational
choice study of the EU.
The chapter is organized in five parts. In the
first, I briefly summarize rational choice as a
‘second-order’ theory of human behavior and
discuss the development of rational choice insti-
tutionalism (RCI), which has been the most
influential branch of rational choice in EU
studies. This section also discusses some of the
most common criticisms of rational choice as an
approach to human behavior, with an emphasis
on its purported methodological ‘pathologies’
and (lack of) empirical fruitfulness, and its
alleged inability to theorize about endogenous
preference formation or change. The second
section briefly considers the range of first-order
rational choice theories of European Union pol-
itics, starting with traditional integration
theories and continuing through liberal inter-
governmentalist, RCI and other mid-range
theories of EU politics. In the third section, I
address empirical applications of rational choice
theories, noting the charges of methodological
pathologies but also suggesting that rational
choice approaches have produced progressive
research programs and shed light on concrete
empirical cases including the legislative, execu-
tive and judicial politics of the EU, as well as on
other questions such as public opinion and
Europeanization. Rational choice-inspired
empirical work on the EU, I argue, has been pre-
dominantly progressive, not pathological. The
fourth section examines some of the challenges to
rational choice theories, including rationalism’s
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empirically important issues, including most
notably the issues of endogenous preference for-
mation and change. Like Checkel’s review of
constructivist theory (in this volume), I do not
focus primarily on the rationalist-constructivist
debate in EU studies, but I do suggest, against
several recent analyses, that the rationalist-con-
structivist debate in EU studies has largely been
a useful and pragmatic one, which has forced
rationalists to confront difficult issues like
endogenous preference formation and sources
of change.A brief fifth section concludes.
RATIONAL CHOICE AS A SECOND-ORDER
(META-) THEORY
Rational choice is, in Wendt’s terms, a ‘second-
order’ theory, concerned with ontological and
epistemological questions such as ‘the nature
of human agency and its relationship to social
structures,the role of ideas and material forces
in social life, the proper form of social expla-
nations and so on’.
2 By contrast with such
broad, second-order social theories, ‘first-
order’ theories are ‘substantive’, ‘domain-
specific’theories about particular social systems
such as the family, Congress, the international
system or the EU. Such first-order theories are
derived from and should be consistent with the
broader second-order theories to which they
belong, but they go beyond second-order
theories in identifying particular social systems
as the object of study, in making specific
assumptions about those systems and their
constituent actors and in making specific
causal or interpretive claims about them
(Wendt 1999: 6; Snidal 2002: 74–5).
As a second-order theory, the rational choice
approach relies on several fundamental assump-
tions about the nature of individual actors and of
the social world that they constitute. At this
broadest level, rational choice is ‘a methodologi-
cal approach that explains both individual and
collective (social) outcomes in terms of individ-
ual goal-seeking under constraints …’ (Snidal
2002: 74, emphasis in original). This for-
mulation, in turn, contains three essential
elements: (1) methodological individualism,
(2) goal-seeking or utility-maximization and
(3) the existence of various institutional or strate-
gic constraints on individual choice.
The first of these elements, methodological
individualism,means simply that rational choice
analyses treat individuals as the basic units of
social analysis. By contrast with ‘holist’
approaches that treat society as basic and derive
individual characteristics from society, rational
choice approaches seek to explain both individ-
ual and collective behavior as the aggregation of
individual choices. Individuals, in this view, act
according to preferences that are assumed to be
fixed, transitive and exogenously given.
Second, individuals are assumed to act so as
maximize their expected utility,subject to con-
straints. That is to say, individuals with fixed
preferences over possible states of the world
calculate the expected utility of alternative
courses of action and choose the action that is
likely to maximize their utility. This ‘logic
of consequentiality’ provides a distinctive
approach to human action and stands in con-
trast to both the ‘logic of appropriateness’, in
which action is guided by the aim of behaving
in conformity with accepted social norms, and
the ‘logic of arguing’, where actors engage in
truth-seeking deliberation, accepting ‘the
power of the better argument’ rather than cal-
culating the utility of alternative courses of
action for themselves (Risse 2000).
Third and finally, individuals choose under
constraints. That is to say, individuals do not
directly choose their ideal states of the world,but
weigh and choose among alternative courses of
action within the constraints of their physical
and social surroundings, and often on the basis
of incomplete information. Rational choice
institutionalist analyses, for example, emphasize
the institutional constraints on individual
behavior, exploring how formal and informal
institutions shape and constrain the choices of
individual actors, while game theorists empha-
size the strategic context of individual choices in
settings where each individual’s payoff varies
with the choices made by others.
3
Rational choice, at this broad, second-order
level of analysis, is not a theory of EU politics or
even of politics more generally, but an umbrella
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these basic assumptions to an additional set of
substantive assumptions about, inter alia, the
nature of the actors, their preferences and the
institutional or strategic settings in which they
interact. Rational choice approaches can, for
example,take individuals,organizations or states
as their basic unit of analysis. They can adopt a
‘thick’ conception of rationality, in which actors
are assumed to be narrowly self-interested, or a
‘thin’ conception, in which rational-actors may
be self-interested or altruistic and may seek a
variety of goals such as wealth, power or even
love (Ferejohn 1991). Rational choice models
can also differ in terms of their assumptions
about individual preferences, the institutional
and strategic situations in which individuals
interact and the quality of the information
available to actors seeking to maximize their
individual utility.Many rational choice theories –
including an increasing number in EU studies –
are formulated as formal models, which express
theoretical models in mathematic terms.
4 In
many other cases, however, theories with ratio-
nalist assumptions are formulated and expressed
verbally,with little or no use of formal modeling,
i.e.‘soft’rational choice.
Given the very basic second-order assump-
tions laid out above and the considerable vari-
ation within rational choice in terms of
substantive assumptions, we should under-
stand rational choice, not as a single theory,
but as a family of first-order theories con-
nected by common assumptions and method-
ology. For this reason, as Wendt (1999) and
Checkel (this volume) point out with regard to
constructivism, rational choice as a second-
order theory cannot be either supported or falsi-
fied by empirical evidence. It is, rather, the
first-order or mid-range theories of politics
derived from rational choice that do – or do
not – provide testable hypotheses and insights
into the politics of various political systems,
including the European Union.
Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Over the past two decades,perhaps the leading
strand of rational choice literature – and
certainly the most influential in EU studies –
has been that of rational choice institutional-
ism, in which formal and (to a lesser extent)
informal institutions have been reintroduced
to the rational choice study of American, com-
parative and international politics. The con-
temporary RCI literature can be traced to the
effort by American political scientists in the
1970s to re-introduce institutional factors,
such as the workings of the committee system,
into formal models of majority voting in the
US Congress. Such scholars number examined
in detail the ‘agenda-setting’ powers of the
Congressional committees, specifying the con-
ditions under which agenda-setting commit-
tees could influence the outcomes of certain
Congressional votes. Congressional scholars
also developed principal-agent models of leg-
islative delegation of authority to the execu-
tive, to independent regulatory agencies and
to courts, analysing the independence of
these various ‘agents’ and the efforts of
Congressional ‘principals’ to control them.
More recently, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999)
and Huber and Shipan (2003) have pioneered
a ‘transaction-cost’ approach to the design of
political institutions, hypothesizing that legis-
lators deliberately and systematically design
political institutions to minimize the transac-
tion costs associated with making public
policy. Throughout this work, rational choice
theorists have studied institutions both as
independent variables that channel individual
choices into ‘institutional equilibria’ and as
dependent variables or ‘equilibrium institu-
tions’ chosen or designed by actors to secure
mutual gains.
Although originally formulated in the context
of American political institutions, these models
are applicable across a range of other compara-
tive and international political contexts. In
recent years, for example, comparativists have
applied RCI concepts to the comparative study
of the design of political institutions (Huber and
Shipan 2003); the significance of ‘veto points’
and ‘veto players’ in public policy-making
(Tsebelis 2002); and the delegation of powers to
independent agencies and courts (Huber and
Shipan 2003).In international relations,the RCI
approach has proven a natural fit with the 
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neoliberal institutionalism and has informed a
number of important works on topics including
the rational design of international institutions
(Koremenos et al. 2003), the delegation of
powers to international organizations (Pollack
2003; Hawkins et al. 2006) and forum-shopping
among various IOs (Jupille and Snidal 2005).
Not surprisingly, RCI has also proven to be
one of the fastest-growing theories of European
integration and EU politics, as we shall see
presently.
Critiques of Rational Choice Theory
Despite its rapid gains across a range of fields
in political science, rational choice as an
approach has been subject to extensive critique
in recent years. Snidal (2002: 73), in his review
of rational choice approaches to IR, usefully
distinguishes between ‘internal critiques’,
which accept the basic approach but debate
‘how to do rational choice’ in methodological
terms, and ‘external critiques’, which identify
alleged weaknesses in the approach as a whole.
There are several ‘internal’critiques of rational
choice,according to Snidal,including an ongo-
ing debate about the virtues and vices of for-
malization,but the most contentious debate of
recent years has been the debate over empirical
testing and falsification of rational choice
theory launched by Green and Shapiro (1994)
in their book, Pathologies of Rational Choice
Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political
Science. Unlike many critics of rational choice,
these authors do not object to the core
assumptions of the approach or to the use of
formal models, and they applaud the scientific
aspirations of most rational choice scholars.
Instead, as their subtitle suggests, Green and
Shapiro (1994: 33) focus on empirical applica-
tions of rational choice models, arguing that
empirical work by rational choice theorists is
subject to a ‘syndrome of fundamental and
recurrent [methodological] failings’ which call
into question the contribution of the rational
choice enterprise to the study of politics.
Specific weaknesses identified by the authors
include the following:
• Rational choice theories are often formulated
in abstract and empirically intractable ways,
with heavy reliance on unobservable
factors and with insufficient attention paid
to the difficulties of operationalizing the
hypothesized variables.
• Rational choice theorists often engage in post
hoc  or ‘retroductive’ theorizing, seeking to
develop rational choice models that might
plausibly explain a set of known facts or an
empirical regularity. At the extreme, Green
and Shapiro argue, this can become an exer-
cise in ‘curve-fitting’, in which assumptions
are manipulated to fit the data,but no subse-
quent effort is made to test the resulting
model with respect to data other than those
used to generate the model.
• When they move from theory to the empir-
ical world, rational choice theorists often
search for confirming evidence of their
theory, engaging in ‘plausibility probes’ or
illustrations of the theory and selecting
cases that are likely to confirm, rather than
falsify, their hypotheses.
• When engaging in empirical tests (or illus-
trations) of their hypotheses, rational
choice scholars frequently ignore alterative
accounts and competing explanations for the
observed outcomes and/or test their
hypotheses against trivial or implausible
null hypotheses (for example, the notion
that political behavior is entirely random).
• Finally, in the rare instances in which ‘no
plausible variant of the theory appears to
work’, rational choice scholars engage in
‘arbitrary domain restriction’,conceding the
inapplicability of rational choice in a given
domain and,hence,arbitrarily ignoring the
theory-infirming evidence from that
domain (Green and Shapiro 1994: 33–46).
Green and Shapiro (1994: 7) survey rational
choice applications to American politics, where
they believe that much of the most sophisticated
work has been done, and they find that, even
here,most empirical work ‘is marred by unscien-
tifically chosen samples, poorly conducted tests,
and tendentious interpretations of results’.
Green and Shapiro’s critique has been
subject to numerous responses from rational
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‘misunderstand the theory, overlook its achieve-
ments or adhere to naïve methodological stan-
dards’ in their indictment of rational choice
(Friedman 1996a: 5).
5 For our purposes in
this chapter, however, Green and Shapiro’s cri-
tique serves as a useful cautionary note: While
there is little dispute in EU studies that rational
choice has made increasing headway into the
field, it remains to be seen whether rational
choice models have made a genuine contribution
to our empirical understanding of EU politics,or
whether empirical applications of rational choice
to the EU have been subject to the methodologi-
cal failings identified by Green and Shapiro.
By contrast with these internal critiques,
‘external critiques’ have been directed at the
rational choice by both constructivists (particu-
larly in IR theory) and psychologists (most often
associated with behavioral economics), who
argue that rational choice emphasizes certain
problems and sets aside other issues by assump-
tion, resulting in ‘ontological blind spots’ and
inaccurate renderings of the empirical world.
Rational choice is ‘found deficient in explaining
who the key actors are, in explaining their inter-
ests, explaining the origin of institutions, or
explaining how these change’ (Snidal 2002: 74).
In EU studies, this external critique is most
common among the growing number of
constructivist scholars who argue that EU insti-
tutions shape not only the behavior but also the
preferences and identities of individuals and
member states in Europe (Sandholtz 1996;
Checkel 2005a, b; Lewis 2005). The argument
is stated most forcefully by Christiansen et al.
(1999: 529), who argue that European integra-
tion has had a ‘transformative impact’ on the
interests and identities of individuals, but that
this transformation ‘will remain largely invisible
in approaches that neglect processes of identity
formation and/or assume interests to be given
exogenously’. Similarly, because of its focus on
institutional equilibria, other critics have
suggested that rational choice is blind to endoge-
nous change, such as appears to be common-
place within the EU.
Later in this Chapter, I examine how the
rational choice study of EU politics has
responded to these internal and external
critiques.With regard to the internal critiques,
I examine the empirical contribution of ratio-
nal choice analyses to five discrete areas of
study in EU politics, asking whether these
studies have fallen prey to Green and Shapiro’s
methodological pathologies. With regard to
external critiques, I inquire into the ability of
rational choice theories to address the issues of
endogenous preference formation and change.
First, however, I consider the role of rational
choice analysis in the development of theories
of European integration and EU politics.
FIRST-ORDER THEORIES OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION AND EU POLITICS
How has rational choice, as a second-order
theory, influenced and shaped the study of the
European Union, including first-order theories
of European integration and EU politics? Ideally,
at this stage one could review the history of
European integration theory, identifying the
various theories as rationalist or not rationalist,
and weighing the fruitfulness of each of the two
categories. Unfortunately, as Jupille (2005: 220)
points out, such an endeavor is complicated by
the fact that ‘scholars are not always explicit
about [their] metatheoretical commitments,
which makes it hard to identify what is on offer,
what is being rejected,and what is at stake’.In the
neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist debates
of the 1960s and 1970s, the primary differences
between the two bodies of theory were substan-
tive, focusing primarily on the relative impor-
tance of various actors (national governments vs
supranational and subnational actors) and on
the presence or absence of a self-sustaining inte-
gration process. The  neofunctionalist/intergov-
ernmentalist debate was not primarily about
second-order questions, and indeed the basic
assumptions of each theory – the relationship
between agents and structure, the logic of
human behavior,etc.– were often left undefined.
Haas’s (1958,2001) neofunctionalism,for exam-
ple, assumed that both the supranational
Commission and subnational interest groups
were sophisticated actors capable of calculating
their respective bureaucratic and economic
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sense Haas laid the groundwork for future ratio-
nalist theories of integration (Moravcsik 1998).
By the same token, however, Haas’s (2001)
theory also focused on the possible transfer of
‘loyalties’ from the national to the European
level, without specifying clearly the nature of
such loyalties, and constructivists have subse-
quently come to identify their work with this
strand of neofunctionalist theory (Risse 2005).
Intergovernmentalist theory, in turn, drew
largely from the soft rational choice tradition
of realist theory, identifying the EU’s member
governments implicitly or explicitly as rational
actors who were both aware of and capable of
forestalling the transfer of authority to supra-
national institutions in Brussels (Hoffmann
1966). By contrast with later rational choice
work, however, early intergovernmentalist
works seldom specified a clear set of prefer-
ences for member governments, beyond a
generic concern for national sovereignty, and
they typically neglected to model the strategic
interaction between governments and the
supranational agents they had created.
In the 1990s, intergovernmentalist theory
gained a clearer set of microfoundations with
Moravcsik’s (1998) ‘liberal intergovernmental-
ism’.In various writings,and particularly in his
book,The Choice for Europe,Moravcsik refined
intergovernmentalism into an explicitly ratio-
nalist theory in which actors were clearly spec-
ified,and predictions about outcomes made,at
various levels of analysis. Specifically,
Moravcsik (1998: 9) nests three complemen-
tary middle-range theories within his larger
rationalist framework: (1) a liberal model of
preference formation, (2) an intergovernmen-
tal model of international bargaining and (3) a
model of institutional choice (drawn largely
from the RCI literature reviewed above) stress-
ing the importance of credible commitments.
As noted earlier, however, the rational choice
study of the European Union is most closely
associated with rational choice institutionalists
who have sought to model both the workings
and the choice of EU institutions. Beginning in
the late 1980s, authors such as Scharpf, Tsebelis
and Garrett sought to model in rational choice
terms the selection and above all the workings
of EU institutions, including the adoption,
execution and adjudication of EU public poli-
cies.
6 Like the broader literature from which
these studies drew inspiration,RCI scholars have
theorized EU institutions both as dependent
variables – as the object of choices by the EU’s
member governments – and as independent
variables that have shaped subsequent policy-
making and policy outcomes.
While much of this literature has been
applied to the workings of EU institutions, the
growing literatures on Europeanization and on
EU enlargement have also drawn on rational
choice institutionalism to generate hypotheses
about the ways in which, and the conditions
under which, EU norms and rules are trans-
mitted from Brussels to the domestic politics
and polities of the various member states
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a;
Börzel and Risse, this volume).
Furthermore, as Ray, Raunio and
Richardson make clear in their respective
chapters on public opinion, political parties
and organized interests (this volume), rational
choice theories of politics have also informed
the study of the attitudes and the behavior of
subnational actors in the EU. The sources of
these theoretical approaches have been varied,
including Eastonian models in the public
opinion literature, spatial models of party
competition in the political parties literature
and Olsonian collective action models in the
study of EU organized interests, and in all
three cases rational choice approaches con-
tinue to co-exist with alternative approaches.
In each case, however, the respective EU litera-
tures have become more theoretically oriented
over time and rational choice theories have
played a key role in the study of domestic and
transnational behavior by individuals, parties
and organized interests.
HAVE RATIONAL CHOICE THEORIES BEEN
EMPIRICALLY FRUITFUL IN EU STUDIES?
The growing presence of rational choice
theory in EU studies, however, raises an addi-
tional set of questions: Has rational choice
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generating testable first-order hypotheses
about outcomes in EU politics? Have these
hypotheses been subjected to careful and sys-
tematic testing, free from the ‘pathologies’
identified by Green and Shapiro? And, if so,
have rationalist hypotheses found support in
rigorous empirical testing? While a complete
response to such questions is beyond the scope
of this chapter, the chapters in this volume –
each of which provides a thorough review of
the scholarship undertaken in a particular area
of EU studies – provide a useful starting point
for at least a preliminary answer. Indeed, a
careful reading of the chapters of this book will
reveal that rational choice theory now has been
applied to virtually every area of EU politics.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that rational
choice theory employs a ‘positive heuristic’
that directs the analyst’s attention to particular
types of questions, and so the contribution of
rational choice has not been uniform across
questions or issue-areas (Lakatos 1970: 135).
Reflecting the widespread importation of
RCI into EU studies, rational choice applica-
tions have made the greatest headway in the
study of EU institutions, and in particular in
the areas of legislative, executive and judicial
politics. In each of these areas, scholars have
been able to draw on a series of ‘off-the-shelf’
theories and models, and previous reviews
have focused largely on these areas (see e.g.
Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Dowding 2000;
Moser et al. 2000; Aspinwall and Schneider
2001; Pollack 2004; Hix 2005; Scully 2005). As
noted above, however, rational choice theories
are no longer limited to the study of formal EU
institutions, but have begun to be applied to
other questions, such as the Europeanization
of domestic politics and public opinion toward
the EU, among others. In this section, I review
the empirical applications and tests of rational
choice theories in each of these five areas,
drawing largely from the excellent reviews of
these areas in the chapters of this book.
7 By
and large, as we shall see, the balance sheet in
these five areas is positive: while there is some
evidence that the positive heuristic of rational
choice theories has directed scholars’ attention
to certain questions to the exclusion of
others, and while some work in each of these
fields has been characterized by one or another
of Green and Shapiro’s methodological
pathologies, across the five areas rational
choice theories have generated specific,
testable hypotheses and the resulting empirical
work has dramatically improved our under-
standing of EU politics and largely (although
not invariably) supported the rationalist
hypotheses in question.
Legislative Politics
Without doubt the best-developed strand of
rational choice theory in EU studies has
focused on EU legislative processes. Drawing
heavily on theories and spatial models of leg-
islative behavior and organization, students of
EU legislative politics have adapted and tested
models of legislative politics to understand the
process of legislative decision-making in the
EU. This literature, as McElroy points out in
her chapter (this volume),has focused on three
major questions: legislative politics within the
European Parliament; the voting power of the
various states in the Council of Ministers; and
the respective powers of these two bodies in
the EU legislative process.
The European Parliament (EP) has been the
subject of extensive theoretical modeling and
empirical study over the past two decades, with
a growing number of scholars studying the leg-
islative organization of the EP and the voting
behavior of its members (MEPs), adapting
models of legislative politics derived largely
from the study of the US Congress. The early
studies of the Parliament,in the 1980s and early
1990s,emphasized the striking fact that,in spite
of the multinational nature of the Parliament,
the best predictor of MEP voting behavior is not
nationality but an MEP’s ‘party group’, with the
various party groups demonstrating extraordi-
narily high measures of cohesion in roll-call
votes. These MEPs, moreover, were shown to
contest elections and cast their votes in a two-
dimensional ‘issue space’,including not only the
familiar nationalism/supranationalism dimen-
sion but also and especially the more tradi-
tional, ‘domestic’ dimension of left–right
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focused on the legislative organization of the EP,
including not only the party groups but also the
Parliament’s powerful committees, whose
members play an important agenda-setting role
in preparing legislation for debate on the floor
of Parliament (Kreppel 2001). Perhaps most
fundamentally, these scholars have shown that
the EP can increasingly be studied as a ‘normal
parliament’ whose members vote predictably
and cohesively within a political space domi-
nated by the familiar contestation between par-
ties of the left and right (Hix et al. 2002).
By contrast with this rich EP literature,
McElroy notes, the rational choice literature on
the Council of Ministers has until very recently
focused primarily on the question of member-
state voting power under different decision rules.
In this context, a number of scholars have used
increasingly elaborate formal models of Council
voting to establish the relative voting weights –
and hence the bargaining power – of various
member states under various qualified majority
voting (QMV) voting formulae. The use of such
voting-power indexes has led to substantial
debate among rational choice scholars, with
several scholars criticizing the approach for its
emphasis on formal voting weight at the expense
of national preferences (Albert 2003). Whatever
the merit of voting-power indexes, it is worth
noting that the study of Council decision-mak-
ing appears to be an area in which the use of off-
the-shelf models has – at least initially – focused
researchers’attention onto a relatively narrow set
of questions,at the expense of other questions of
equally great substantive interest.In recent years,
however, a growing number of scholars have
begun to examine voting and coalition patterns
in the Council, noting the puzzling lack of
minimum-winning coalitions, the extensive use
of unanimous voting (even where QMV is an
option) and the existence of a North–South
cleavage within the Council.
8
Third and finally, a large and ever-growing
literature has attempted to model in rational
choice terms and to study empirically the inter-
institutional relations among the Commission
(as agenda setter) and the Council and
Parliament, under different legislative proce-
dures. Over the course of the 1980s and the
1990s, the legislative powers of the EP have
grown sequentially, from the relatively modest
and non-binding ‘consultation procedure’
through the creation of the ‘cooperation’ and
‘assent’ procedures in the 1980s and the cre-
ation and reform of a ‘co-decision procedure’
in the 1990s. This expansion of EP legislative
power and the complex nature of the new leg-
islative procedures has fostered the develop-
ment of a burgeoning literature and led to
several vigorous debates among rational choice
scholars about the nature and extent of the
EP’s and the Council’s respective influence
across the various procedures. The first of
these debates concerned the power of the
European Parliament under the cooperation
procedure. In an influential article, Tsebelis
(1994) argued that this provision gave the
Parliament ‘conditional agenda-setting’ power,
insofar as the Parliament would now enjoy the
ability to make specific proposals that would
be easier for the Council to adopt than to
amend. Other scholars disputed Tsebelis’s
model, arguing that the EP’s proposed amend-
ments would have no special status without
the approval of the Commission, which there-
fore remained the principal agenda setter. This
theoretical debate, in turn, motivated a series
of empirical studies which appeared to con-
firm the basic predictions of Tsebelis’s model,
namely that the Parliament enjoyed much
greater success in influencing the content of
legislation under cooperation than under the
older consultation procedure (Kreppel 1999).
A second controversy emerged in the litera-
ture over the power of Parliament under the
co-decision procedure introduced by the
Maastricht Treaty (co-decision I) and
reformed by the Treaty of Amsterdam (co-
decision II). In another controversial article,
Tsebelis (1997) argued that, contrary to com-
mon perceptions of the co-decision procedure
as a step forward for the EP, Parliament had
actually lost legislative power in the move from
cooperation to co-decision I.By contrast,other
rational choice scholars disputed Tsebelis’s
claims, noting that alternative  specifications
of the model predicted more modest
agenda-setting power for the EP under cooper-
ation and/or a stronger position for the EP in
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qualitative empirical analyses have provided at
least tentative answers to the question of EP
influence across the various legislative proce-
dures,with the most extensive study suggesting
that the EP has indeed enjoyed greater legisla-
tive influence under co-decision I than under
cooperation, largely at the expense of the
Commission (Tsebelis et al.2001).In any event,
the Treaty of Amsterdam subsequently simpli-
fied the co-decision procedure, creating a gen-
uinely bicameral co-decision II procedure.
To some observers, these debates have
verged on scholasticism, focusing more on
model specification than on the empirical real-
ity of legislative decision-making, and coming
around to empirical testing relatively late in
the day (Crombez et al. 2000; Garrett et al.
2001). Taken as a whole, however, the debate
over the EP’s legislative powers, like early work
on the internal organization of the Parliament,
has both clarified the basic theoretical assump-
tions that scholars make about the various
actors and their preferences and motivated sys-
tematic empirical studies that have generated
cumulative knowledge about the EU legislative
process.
Executive Politics
The study of EU executive politics, Tallberg
points out in his chapter, is not the exclu-
sive preserve of rational choice scholars. Neo-
functionalists and intergovernmentalists have
been debating the causal role of the executive
Commission for decades,and the Commission
has been studied as well by sociological institu-
tionalists, by students of political entrepreneur-
ship and by normative democratic theorists.
Nevertheless, as Tallberg also points out, RCI
and principal-agent analysis have emerged
over the past decade as the dominant approach
to the study of the Commission and other
executive actors such as the European Central
Bank and the growing body of EU agencies.
These studies generally address two specific
sets of questions. First, they ask why and
under what conditions a group of (member-
state)  principals might delegate powers to
(supranational) agents, such as the Commission,
the European Central Bank or the Court of
Justice.With regard to this first question, prin-
cipal-agent accounts of delegation hypothesize
that member-state principals, as rational
actors, delegate powers to supranational orga-
nizations primarily to lower the transaction
costs of policymaking, in particular by allow-
ing member governments to commit them-
selves credibly to international agreements and
to benefit from the policy-relevant expertise
provided by supranational actors. Utilizing a
variety of quantitative and qualitative meth-
ods, the empirical work of these scholars has
collectively demonstrated that EU member
governments do indeed delegate powers to the
Commission and other agents largely to reduce
the transaction costs of policymaking, in par-
ticular through the monitoring of member-
state compliance, the filling-in of ‘incomplete
contracts’ and the speedy and efficient adop-
tion of implementing regulations (Moravcsik
1998; Franchino 2002, 2004, 2007; Pollack
2003). By contrast with these positive results,
however, scholars have found little or no
support for the hypothesis that member states
delegate powers to the Commission to take
advantage of its superior expertise (Moravcsik
1998; Pollack 2003).
In addition to the question of delegation,
rational choice institutionalists have devoted
greater attention to a second question posed by
principal-agent models: What if an agent –
such as the Commission, the Court of Justice,
or the ECB – behaves in ways that diverge from
the preferences of the principals? The answer
to this question in principal-agent analysis lies
primarily in the administrative procedures
that the principals may establish to define ex
ante the scope of agency activities, as well as
the oversight procedures that allow for ex post
oversight and sanctioning of errant agents.
Applied to the EU, principal-agent analysis
leads to the hypothesis that agency autonomy
is likely to vary across issue-areas and over
time, as a function of the preferences of the
member governments, the distribution of
information between principals and agents,
and the decision rules governing the appl-
ication of sanctions or the adoption of new
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executive politics in the EU have supported
these hypotheses, pointing in particular to the
significance of decision rules as a crucial deter-
minant of executive autonomy (Pollack 1997,
2003; Tallberg 2000, 2003).
In sum, the rational choice, principal-agent
approach has indeed, as Tallberg argues, come
to dominate the study of the Commission and
other executive actors in the past several
decades. This principal-agent literature, like
other rational choice approaches, can be criti-
cized for its focus on a particular set of (albeit
very important) questions about the relation-
ship between principals and agents and for
its neglect of other equally important
questions such as the internal workings of
executive organizations like the Commission.
Furthermore,as Hix argues in his contribution
to this volume, the traditional PA assumption
that the Commission is an outlier with partic-
ularly intense preferences for greater integra-
tion may be misleading in the post-Maastricht
era where the EU has already placed markers in
nearly every area of public policy. Nevertheless,
principal-agent models have provided a theo-
retical framework to ask a series of pointed
questions about the causes and consequences
of delegating executive power to EU actors,
and they have directed scholars’ attention to
factors such as transaction costs, information
asymmetries and the operation of formal rules
and administrative law, that had been
neglected or indeed ignored by earlier studies.
Just as importantly, challenges such as Hix’s
can be accommodated within the rational
choice tradition and can generate additional
testable hypotheses that promise to advance
further our systematic knowledge of executive
politics in the EU.
Judicial Politics
In addition to the lively debate about the
nature of EU executive politics, rational choice
institutionalists have also engaged in an
increasingly sophisticated research program
into the nature of EU judicial politics and
the role of the European Court of Justice,
examined by Conant in this volume.Writing in
the early 1990s, for example, Garrett (1992)
first drew on principal-agent analysis to argue
that the Court,as an agent of the EU’s member
governments, was bound to follow the wishes
of the most powerful member states. These
member states,Garrett argued,had established
the ECJ as a means to solve problems of
incomplete contracting and monitoring com-
pliance with EU obligations, and they ratio-
nally accepted ECJ jurisprudence, even when
rulings went against them, because of their
longer-term interest in the enforcement of EU
law. In such a setting, Garrett and Weingast
(1993: 189) argued, the ECJ might identify
‘constructed focal points’ among multiple
equilibrium outcomes, but the Court was
unlikely to rule against the preferences of
powerful EU member states.
Responding to Garrett’s work, other schol-
ars argued forcefully that Garrett’s model over-
estimated the control mechanisms available to
powerful member states and the ease of sanc-
tioning an activist Court, which has been far
more autonomous than Garrett suggests, and
that Garrett’s empirical work misread the pref-
erences of the member governments and the
politics of internal market reform. Such
accounts suggest that the Court has been able
to pursue the process of legal integration far
beyond the collective preferences of the mem-
ber governments, in part because of the high
costs to member states in overruling or failing
to comply with ECJ decisions, and in part
because the ECJ enjoys powerful allies in the
form of national courts, which refer hundreds
of cases per year to the ECJ via the ‘preliminary
reference’ procedure (Mattli and Slaughter
1995, 1998; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998;
Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998; Alter 2001).
In this view, best summarized by Stone Sweet
and Caporaso (1998: 129), ‘the move to
supremacy and direct effect must be under-
stood as audacious acts of agency’ by the
Court. Responding to these critiques, rational
choice analyses of the ECJ have become more
nuanced over time, acknowledging the limits
of member-state control over the Court and
testing hypotheses about the conditions under
which the ECJ enjoys the greatest autonomy
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Garrett et al. 1998; Kilroy 1999; Pollack 2003).
More recently, as Conant points out, the lit-
erature on the ECJ and legal integration has
increasingly moved from the traditional ques-
tion of the ECJ’s relationship with national
governments toward the study of the ECJ’s
other interlocutors,including most notably the
national courts that bring the majority of cases
before the ECJ and the individual litigants who
use EU law to achieve their aims within
national legal systems. Such studies have prob-
lematized and sought to explain the complex
and ambivalent relationship between the ECJ
and national courts, as well as the varying liti-
gation strategies of ‘one-shot’ litigants and
‘repeat players’ before the courts (Mattli and
Slaughter 1998; Alter 2001; Conant 2002).
These and other studies, influenced largely
(although not exclusively) by rational choice
models,have demonstrated the complexities of
ECJ legal integration, the inter-relationships
among supranational, national and subna-
tional political and legal actors, and the limits
of EU law in national legal contexts.
Europeanization in Member States and
Candidate Countries
In contrast to the previous sections, which
focused on the behavior and policies of EU insti-
tutions, an increasing number of studies have
focused in recent years on the effects of the EU
on domestic politics within the EU’s old and
new member states – the ‘Europeanization’liter-
ature reviewed in this volume by Börzel and
Risse. Perhaps most interestingly for our pur-
poses here, Börzel and Risse (2000, this volume)
have suggested that Europeanization could be
theorized in terms of two distinct mechanisms,
the one derived from rational choice and
emphasizing a logic of consequences, the other
derived from sociological institutionalism and
emphasizing a logic of appropriateness. In the
former, rationalist version, ‘the misfit between
European and domestic processes, policies and
institutions provides societal and/or political
actors with new opportunities and constraints in
the pursuance of their interests’. Whether these
actors could in turn secure domestic changes is
hypothesized to depend on two key factors
emphasized in off-the-shelf RC theories: the
existence of multiple veto players and facilitating
formal institutions providing resources and
opportunities to various domestic actors. By
contrast, the sociological perspective theorized
that European norms and rules might exert an
influence through persuasion and socialization,
with domestic outcomes being mitigated by
factors such as the existence of domestic ‘norm
entrepreneurs’ to mobilize domestic support
and a political culture conducive to consensus-
building and cost-sharing (Börzel and Risse
2000: 2). Rationalism and constructivism meet
here, not as colliding meta-theories, but as first-
order theories that predict different mechanisms
of Europeanization and different facilitating
factors that would explain the variable impact of
‘Europe’in different domestic settings.
The explicit derivation and testing of
competing rationalist and constructivist
hypotheses, moreover, has not been limited to
the study of Europeanization in the ‘old’mem-
ber states,but has turned since the late 1990s in
a concerted fashion to the impacts of the EU
on the candidate and new member countries
of southern and eastern Europe. Students of
EU enlargement had for some time framed
many of their research questions in terms of
the rationalist-constructivist debate, including
a number of studies that grappled with the
EU’s decision to enlarge and the substantive
terms of enlargement negotiated with the can-
didate countries (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2002).Toward the end of the 1990s
and into the current decade, many of these
scholars turned to studying the effects of the
EU on candidate and new member countries.
In the most extensive such study,
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a) led a
team of researchers who sought explicitly to test
alternative rationalist and constructivist
hypotheses about the effect of EU membership
on the new member states in central and eastern
Europe. Drawing on previous rationalist and
constructivist work, Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier (2005b) derived three distinct models
of the mechanisms driving the Europeanization
of the candidate/new member countries of
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incentives’ model was derived from rational
choice models of bargaining, focusing on the
asymmetrical bargaining power of the EU and its
applicant states and in particular on EU ‘condi-
tionality’, namely the EU’s insistence that candi-
date countries apply the acquis communautaire as
a prerequisite to membership. Against this ratio-
nalist model, the authors put up two competing
constructivist or sociological institutionalist
accounts – a ‘social learning’model predicated on
a ‘logic of appropriateness’ and focusing on the
socialization of state and civil-society actors in
the target countries, and a ‘lesson-drawing’
model in which dissatisfied governments in
central and eastern Europe actively seek out and
import EU practices, with the Union itself play-
ing an essentially passive role.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s findings,
based on a series of case studies cutting across
multiple countries and multiple issue-areas, pro-
vide striking support for the external incentives
model.While various studies in the larger project
found some instances of socialization and/or
lesson-drawing in the absence of conditionality,
the authors conclude that, on balance,‘the exter-
nal incentives provided by the EU can largely
account for the impact of the EU on candidate
countries’. Observed variations in rule adoption,
moreover,are explained in large part by the inde-
pendent variables hypothesized in the external
incentives model,including most notably a cred-
ible membership perspective and clear political
conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005c: 210–11). Other recent studies employ
varying theoretical frameworks and focus on dif-
ferent aspects of the Europeanization process,but
here too the general finding is that explicit and
credible political conditionality is the most
important source of EU leverage and policy
change in the new and candidate countries, with
socialization and lesson-drawing having a much
weaker and more variable impact (Jacoby 2004;
Kelley 2004; Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig
2005; Zürn and Checkel 2005).
In sum, the growing literatures on
Europeanization and enlargement are striking
for two features, both of which augur well for
the field.First,scholars have generally adopted a
pragmatic,‘tool-kit’approach to rational choice
and constructivist theories, deriving distinctive
causal mechanisms and scope conditions for
Europeanization from each theory and testing
them with care and precision. Second, in these
studies, external incentives in the form of polit-
ical conditionality have emerged as the best pre-
dictor of policy change in old as well as new
member states,and the scope conditions associ-
ated with rational choice theory have performed
well in explaining variation across both issue-
areas and countries.
Public Opinion and European Integration
The scholarly literature on EU public opinion,
analysed in this volume by Ray, was relatively
late to develop,due in large part to the empha-
sis by early integration theorists on elite atti-
tudes, with mass opinion frequently depicted
as a ‘permissive consensus’ within which elites
could pursue integrative schemes (Haas 1958;
Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). In recent
decades, however, the EU public-opinion liter-
ature has blossomed, driven in part by events
(direct elections of the European Parliament,
dramatic referenda on European integration in
EU member states) and in part by the avail-
ability of Eurobarometer polling data.
The EU public opinion literature, as Ray
points out, has been largely problem-driven and
theoretically eclectic,drawing on rational-choice
models alongside socialization, political com-
munications and other theoretical approaches to
generate competing hypotheses about the deter-
minants of public support for the EU.This eclec-
tic approach can be traced back to Lindberg and
Scheingold’s (1970) pioneering work on EU
support for European integration, in which an
essentially rationalist or ‘utilitarian’ support
(based on calculation of tangible economic ben-
efits from integration) was contrasted with
‘affective’ support rooted in a more ‘diffuse and
emotional’ response to the European project.
This distinction has remained a fundamental
feature of the subsequent literature, which con-
tinues to derive and competitively test hypothe-
ses from diverse theoretical traditions about the
determinants of public support for European
integration, EU institutions and EU policies.
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opinion,which Ray associates with the study of
utilitarian support,has itself been theoretically
and methodologically diverse, with various
scholars identifying different independent
variables as determinants of public support
and operationalizing both dependent and
independent variables in different ways using
various survey questions from Eurobarometer
and other data sources. Some utilitarian
models,for example,have focused on EU fiscal
transfers or on objective economic conditions
at the national level as predictors of support,
while others have identified the objective
socioeconomic characteristics of individuals
or else subjective individual evaluations of
economic costs and benefits, as the best mea-
sures of utilitarian support. There is, in other
words, no single ‘rational choice theory’ of
EU public opinion, but a huge variety of
first-order theories and hypotheses, each
of which has been subjected to empirical test-
ing, typically using quantitative analyses of
Eurobarometer survey data. The complex and
sometimes inconclusive empirical findings of
this literature are summarized by Leonard,
who notes that the most robust findings point
to the importance of socioeconomic status
(‘human capital’) and subjective economic
perceptions as predictors of support for
European integration.The impact of such util-
itarian factors is not uncontested, with some
studies arguing that identity is at least as strong
a predictor of public opinion toward the EU as
economic interest (Hooghe and Marks 2004),
but the central place of rational-choice or 
utilitarian models in the literature is clear.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the
public opinion literature for our purposes is its
close approximation of Green and Shapiro’s
(1994) ideal type of social-scientific research.
Unlike some other, more theoretically driven
areas of EU research, work on EU public
opinion has indeed been problem-driven and
theoretically eclectic, with even strongly ratio-
nalist scholars like Gabel (1998) testing affective
and other sources of support alongside utilitar-
ian hypotheses. Furthermore, while one can
question the operationalization of variables or
the selection of data in any individual study,the
public opinion literature as a whole has steered
well clear of Green and Shapiro’s methodologi-
cal pathologies, relying as it has on multivariate
statistical testing of competing hypotheses
drawn from distinct theoretical approaches.
The Empirical Fruitfulness of Rational
Choice Theory
In sum, rational choice theory appears – at
least in the five areas examined here – to have
been an empirically fruitful as well as a theo-
retically innovative approach to the study of
EU politics. While some literatures have
indeed focused for extended periods on model
specification in the absence of hard empirical
data, over time each of the above literatures
has produced specific, testable hypotheses
about the relative power of legislative, execu-
tive and judicial actors,about the determinants
of public opinion toward the EU and about the
effects of the EU on domestic politics in the
member and candidate states. Just as impor-
tantly, moreover, most of the rational choice
literature in EU studies appears to have
avoided the pathologies identified by Green
and Shapiro. While individual studies might
derive formal models in the absence of empir-
ical testing or conduct superficial empirical
work designed to support or illustrate rather
than test theories,many scholars in each of the
literatures reviewed above have identified con-
crete, measurable dependent and independent
variables; collected systematic quantitative and
qualitative data to test their hypotheses;
reported findings (including negative and puz-
zling findings) honestly; and revised and
derived new theories in light of those findings.
By and large, moreover, the hypotheses gen-
erated by the various first-order (or middle-
range) rationalist theories have found empirical
support: MEPs do respond to institutional
incentives in their voting behavior; the
Commission does appear to enjoy variable
influence according to the factors emphasized
by principal-agent analysis; the Court of Justice
does enjoy extraordinary (but not boundless)
discretion vis-à-vis the member governments;
individuals do appear to base their opinions of
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utility; and member and candidate countries do
appear to respond most consistently to material
incentives provided by the EU. While the
debates in all these areas remain ongoing, the
best rational choice work of the past decade has
been empirically as well as theoretically rigorous
and fruitful and has advanced our understand-
ing of EU politics from the Brussels institutions
to the member governments to individual
opinions and behavior.
CHALLENGES FOR RATIONALIST
ANALYSIS OF THE EU
Still, the reader may ask, what do rational
choice approaches leave out or ignore in their
study of EU politics? In addition to the ‘inter-
nal’ critique of poor empirical work, rational
choice has also been subject to an ‘external’
critique, which emphasizes its limited domain
of application and its ‘ontological blindness’to
important questions. Indeed, even within the
five issues examined above, we noticed a ten-
dency for rational choice approaches to focus,
at least initially, on questions that are most
amenable to study using off-the-shelf models
while paying less attention to other equally
important questions. Looking beyond our five
selected issues, the external critique from con-
structivism raises three inter-related issues that
I examine, very briefly, in this section. I con-
sider first whether the purported ‘great debate’
between rationalism and constructivism has
been a metatheoretical dialogue of the deaf or a
useful controversy and I then go on to consider
the ability of rational choice approaches to
theorize about endogenous preference forma-
tion and endogenous sources of change,
respectively.
Rationalism vs Constructivism: A Useful
Controversy
Within both international relations and EU
studies, the past decade has witnessed a
marked change in the presentation of the field.
By the late 1990s, and into the early 2000s, it
was commonplace for scholars to depict both
IR and EU studies as being characterized by a
new ‘great debate’ between rational choice and
constructivism, displacing earlier debates such
as that between neofunctionalism and inter-
governmentalism (Katzenstein et al. 1998;
Christiansen et al. 1999; Moravcsik 1999;
Checkel and Moravcsik 2001).
By the start of the current decade, however,
a number of scholars noted the drawbacks of
engaging in a grand meta-theoretical debate
between rationalism and constructivism in
both IR theory and EU studies. In an influen-
tial essay,Fearon and Wendt (2002) focused on
the potential pitfalls of organizing the field of
international relations around an ontological
or empirical debate between rationalism and
constructivism writ large. Such an approach,
they argue, ‘can encourage scholars to be
method-driven rather than problem driven in
their research’, leading scholars to ignore
important questions or answers that do not fit
easily into the grand debate (Fearon and
Wendt: 52). In place of such a debate, the
authors suggest that scholars approach rational
choice and constructivist approaches pragmat-
ically, as analytical ‘tool-kits’ that ‘ask some-
what different questions and so bring different
aspects of social life into focus’ (Fearon and
Wendt 2002: 53). The study of international
politics may indeed be characterized by the
existence of two second-order theories, but
scholars’ empirical work need not – and
indeed should not – be organized purely in
terms of a zero-sum battle among competing
paradigms. Rather, the authors suggest, schol-
ars can and should engage in problem-driven
research, drawing on first-order theories from
either or both approaches as appropriate.
Within EU studies, scholars have similarly
warned against a metatheoretical dialogue of
the deaf,seeking instead to encourage dialogue
between the two approaches and focusing
debate on first-order questions that can be
resolved through careful empirical work.
Moravcsik (1999), for example, rejects the call
for ‘more metatheory’, calling instead for theo-
rists to articulate ‘distinct falsifiable hypothe-
ses’ and to test these hypotheses against
competing theories from other approaches.
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et al. 2003) have recently put forward a frame-
work for promoting integration of – or at least a
fruitful dialogue between – rationalist and con-
structivist approaches to international relations.
Rationalism and constructivism, the authors
argue, are not hopelessly incommensurate, but
can engage each other through ‘four distinct
modes of theoretical conversation’, namely:
(1) competitive testing, in which competing
theories are pitted against each other in
explaining a single event or class of events;
(2) a ‘domain of application’ approach, in
which each theory is considered to
explain some sub-set of empirical reality;
(3) a ‘sequencing’ approach, in which one
theory might explain a particular step in a
sequence of actions (e.g. a constructivist
explanation of national preferences) while
another theory might best explain subse-
quent developments (e.g. a rationalist
explanation of subsequent bargaining);
and
(4) ‘incorporation’ or ‘subsumption’, in which
one theory claims to subsume the other.
Looking at the substantive empirical work in
their special issue, Jupille et al. find that most
contributions to the rationalist/constructivist
debate utilize competitive testing, while only a
small number have adopted the domain of appli-
cation, sequencing or subsumption approaches.
Nevertheless, they see substantial progress in the
debate, in which both sides generally accept a
common standard of empirical testing as the
criterion for useful theorizing about EU politics.
Similarly, the review of empirical applications
in EU studies conducted above suggests that the
rationalist/constructivist debate has not been a
dialogue of the deaf but a ‘useful controversy’,
forcing scholars on both sides to articulate clear
assumptions, test their hypotheses against
competing explanations and specify alternative
causal mechanisms for phenomena like
Europeanization. In addition, the rationalist-
constructivist debate has pressed rational-choice
theorists to address two vital issues that have been
at the margins of the approach:endogenous pref-
erence formation and change.
Endogenous Preference Formation
One of the central bones of contention between
rationalists and constructivists – both generally
and in EU studies – has been the issue of
endogenous preference formation. To some
extent, this debate has been muddied from the
outset by a lack of clarity about the meanings of
the terms ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’. For
many theorists, exogeneity and endogeneity are
characteristics of theories – what they seek to
explain and what they leave unexplained.In this
view, to say that actor preferences are ‘exoge-
nously given’ means that the theorist makes no
attempt to explain preferences, but simply
adopts assumptions about them in order to
theorize and make predictions about some
other dependent variable or explanandum,such
as actor behavior or policy outcomes. By con-
trast, other theories ‘endogenize’ actor prefer-
ences, in the precise sense of making those
preferences the explanandum or dependent
variable of the study. Rational choice theorists
are typically seen to take the first approach,
adopting simplifying assumptions about actor
preferences (and hence making them exogenous
to the theory, which makes no effort to explain
them), whereas constructivists tend to place
actors’ identities and interests at the center of
the analysis and attempt to explain them, fre-
quently with regard to the social contexts that
actors inhabit (Fearon and Wendt 2002: 60).
Muddying the waters, however, a slightly
different interpretation of exogeneity and
endogeneity has arisen in the debate between
rational choice institutionalists and construc-
tivists in IR and EU studies. In these institu-
tionalist accounts, a number of constructivist
authors have argued that the preferences of
various national actors are endogenous to the
international institution in question, e.g. that
actor preferences are shaped (at least in part)
by interaction and socialization at the interna-
tional level (e.g. Sandholtz 1996; Checkel
2005a,b,Lewis 2005).In contrast,scholars who
believe that national preferences are formu-
lated domestically and are unaltered by inter-
action at the international level are often
depicted as claiming that national preferences
are exogenous to international institutions.
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exogenous or endogenous to a theory,a s
opposed to being exogenous or endogenous to
an international institution – matters in assessing
the purported ‘ontological blindness’of rational-
ism to this question.If we take the first approach,
urged on us by Fearon and Wendt (2002:60),the
question is whether rational choice theories are
clearly capable of ‘endogenizing’ – of seeking to
explain – preferences, including the ‘national
preferences’ of states in the international
system.If it could be shown that rational choice
is truly incapable of theorizing national prefer-
ences as an explanandum, then we might argue
that the correct relationship between the two
approaches may be ‘domain of application’ or
‘sequencing’ relationship, in which construc-
tivists focus on explaining preferences and
rationalists limit their efforts to modeling
interactions among actors with exogenously
given preferences.
Such a neat division of labor, however, does
not stand up to careful scrutiny.Rational choice
theorists have not abandoned the effort to
explain actor preferences, particularly in inter-
national relations and in EU studies, where
national preference formation has been a sig-
nificant object of study for rationalists as well
as constructivists.Within EU studies,for exam-
ple, Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal theory of
national preference formation seeks to explain
national preferences through the aggregation of
individual and producer preferences by
national governments and clearly endogenizes
national preference formation in this sense.
More broadly, rational choice theorists in IR
have theorized explicitly and in a variety
of ways about the endogenous formation of
national preferences,including a range of mod-
els that focus on political and economic coali-
tions, principal-agent relations, audience costs
and the effects of regime types and institutional
rules on the aggregation of individual prefer-
ences at the national level (Snidal 2002: 84–5).
By and large, such accounts retain simplifying
assumptions about individual preferences,
focusing instead on the creation of testable
hypotheses about the impact of factors such as
economic change and domestic institutions on
the aggregation of individual preferences into
national preferences.Evolutionary game theorists
go even further, seeking to explain individual
preference formation through mechanisms of
complex learning and selection (Gerber and
Jackson 1993; Fearon and Wendt 2002: 65).
Clearly,then,rational choice theory is not blind
to the question of endogenous preference for-
mation, nor have rationalists been unproduc-
tive in formulating and testing first-order
theories about it.
Hence, when rationalists in EU studies and
international relations are charged with blind-
ness toward endogenous preference formation,
it is typically in the second and more narrow
sense, i.e. that rationalists are unable to theorize
about the purported socializing impact of inter-
national/EU institutions on states (or on their
representatives). Here, critics of rational choice
are on firmer ground:Moravscik’s (1998) liberal
intergovernmentalism, the most prominent
rationalist theory to problematize and explain
national preferences, does indeed rule out any
socializing impact of international interaction
on national preferences, in favor of a purely
domestic process of preference formation. Even
here, however, rational choice theory is not
entirely irrelevant to the study of socialization
in EU institutions, and indeed a recent special
issue of International Organization usefully for-
mulates and tests three distinct mechanisms of
socialization drawn from rational choice theory
(‘strategic calculation’), sociological institution-
alism (‘role playing’) and Habermasian com-
municative rationality (‘normative suasion’)
(Checkel 2005a, b). The contributors to the
volume take a problem-driven approach, draw-
ing pragmatically from various theoretical
approaches to identify different mechanisms of
socialization as well as the scope conditions for
their operations,and their approach to rational-
ist theory is open-minded rather than exclu-
sionary.On the one hand,editor Jeffery Checkel
suggests that rational choice theories are limited
to explaining certain elements of international
institutions, including ‘behavioral adaptation’
(typically as a response to political conditional-
ity and other incentives offered by international
institutions) and simple learning (in response to
new information provided by international insti-
tutions), while true socialization (understood
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a logic of consequences to a logic of appropri-
ateness) appears to lie outside the core assump-
tions of the rational choice approach.‘While …
the ontological differences separating rational-
ism and constructivism are often overstated’, he
argues, ‘the former is nonetheless ill-equipped
to theorize those instances in which the basic
properties of agents are changing’ (Checkel
2005b: 810).
On the other hand, despite these limitations,
several of the volume’s authors argue that ratio-
nal choice theory is capable of theorizing
important elements of the socialization process
and that the empirical findings of the project are
in each case subject to a ‘double-interpretation’,
in which empirical outcomes can be construed
as consistent with a rational choice as well as a
constructivist explanation (Johnston 2005;
Zürn and Checkel 2005). Several of the studies
in the volume, for example, point to the central
importance of material incentives, which
emerge as a stronger predictor of sustained
compliance than socialization without such
incentives,and a general finding of the project is
that the researchers did not ‘see as much social-
ization as expected’– findings clearly consistent
with even a thick rational choice perspective
(Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1068; see also Kelley
2004; Schimmelfennig 2005; Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier 2005c). Furthermore, they
argue,even findings that appear at first glance to
be clearly in support of the constructivist
approach, such as the emergence of a culture of
compromise with the EU’s Committee of
Permanent Representatives, can be plausibly
interpreted in thin-rationalist terms as instances
of political delegation, diffuse reciprocity or
simple learning (Zürn and Checkel 2005:
1056–1065). For all of these reasons, Zürn and
Checkel echo Fearon and Wendt (2002) in
advocating a pragmatic approach to the ratio-
nalist/constructivist divide, in which overlaps
are acknowledged and differences highlighted
through a careful dialogue among first- and
second-order theories of international politics.
In sum, rational choice theory is certainly
capable of theorizing endogenous preference
formation, particularly insofar as national pref-
erences are derived from the aggregation of
individual preferences through domestic political
institutions; and even the study of international
socialization can benefit from the articulation of
a discrete set of rationalist hypotheses which may
fall short of predicting changes in the core pref-
erences of actors, but nevertheless provide com-
pelling explanations for a wide range of related
empirical phenomena.
Theorizing Change
A final weakness of rational choice analysis is its
purported inability to theorize change – or more
precisely to theorize ‘endogenous’ change. Here
again, we encounter some diversity in the use of
the terms exogenous and endogenous.If we take
Fearon and Wendt’s (2002) definition, invoked
above, then a theory that endogenizes change is
one that seeks to theorize about and explain the
sources of change, whereas a theory that exoge-
nizes change is one that takes the source of
change – say, the rise of a new great power, or a
change in relative prices on world markets – as
an assumption and seeks to examine the effects
of that source on an existing equilibrium. The
key difference, again, is whether the source of
change is taken as an unexplained independent
variable (hence, exogenous) or is explained in
some way by the theory (endogenous).
Within institutionalist theory, by contrast,
the terms endogenous and exogenous have
taken on a distinct,if overlapping,meaning.In
this view, carefully articulated by Helfer
(2006), exogeneity and endogeneity are
defined in reference to the institution or orga-
nization being studied. In this view, widely
shared by institutionalist IR scholars, ‘change
emanating from IO officials and staff is prop-
erly labeled as “endogenous” whereas that
change resulting from shifts in state prefer-
ences or from alterations to the economic,
political or social environment is appropriately
described as “exogenous”’ (Helfer 2006: 4).
Regardless of which of these definitions we
accept, it has become commonplace to suggest
that rational choice theories,with their emphasis
on stable equilibria from which no actor has an
incentive to depart, place a theoretical emphasis
on stability rather than on change.Indeed,if the
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‘no one has an incentive to deviate from the
behavior associated with the institution’, then by
definition ‘any changes in self-enforcing institu-
tions must have an extraneous origin’(Greif and
Laitin 2004: 633). Thus, to the extent that ratio-
nal choice models do address change, such
change is typically attributed to exogenous
shocks that (temporarily) upset an equilibrium
and lead (eventually) to a new equilibrium
(Helfer 2006: 4).
Looking specifically to EU studies, it appears
that even the best rational choice work shares
this tendency to either neglect the issue of
change or to attribute change to exogenous
shocks. Moravcsik’s (1998) The Choice for
Europe, for example, problematizes both
national preferences and institutional change,
but his analysis traces the primary sources of
change to exogenous developments in the global
economy. Similarly, Carrubba and Volden’s
(2001) formal model of change in Council
voting rules, while also addressing directly the
issue of change, attributes those changes to
exogenous (unexplained) changes in the num-
ber of member states, changes in legislative pro-
cedures and changes in policy areas under
consideration, each of which can affect the
Council’s ability to pass legislation and thus pro-
vide member states with a rational incentive to
consider changes to the Council’s voting rules
and weights. These works, unlike much rational
choice work on the EU, do theorize a process of
change, but the sources of change remain
exogenous – both to the institutions of the
Union and more broadly to the theories being
advanced. Given the rapid pace of institutional
and policy change in the European Union over
the past several decades, this relative inattention
to endogenous sources of change – which has
long been the bread-and-butter of neofunction-
alist theory – seems a surprising lacuna.
As a variant on RCI, historical institutional-
ism seems a more promising approach to
studying change within institutions like the
EU. By contrast with rational choice’s focus on
stable equilibria,historical institutionalism has
focused on the effects of institutions over time,
and in particular at the ways in which a given
set of institutions, once established, can shape
or constrain the behavior of the actors who
established them. Political institutions and
public policies, in this view, are frequently
characterized by ‘increasing returns’, insofar as
those institutions and policies create incentives
for actors to stick within and not abandon
existing institutions,adapting them only incre-
mentally to changing political environments.
Insofar as political institutions and public poli-
cies are in fact characterized by increasing
returns, Pierson (2000, 2004) argues, politics
will be characterized by certain inter-related
phenomena, including: inertia or lock-ins,
whereby existing institutions may remain in
equilibrium for extended periods despite con-
siderable exogenous change; a critical role for
timing and sequencing, in which relatively
small and contingent events that occur at crit-
ical junctures early in a sequence shape and
constrain events that occur later; and path-
dependence, whereby early decisions provide
rational incentives for actors to perpetuate
institutional and policy choices inherited from
the past, even when the resulting outcomes are
manifestly inefficient. Such theories, while
rejecting the equilibrium analysis of much
rational-choice work, frequently adopt basic
assumptions about actors and institutions that
are fully consistent with those of rational
choice (North 1990; Pierson 2000, 2004).
Historical institutionalism has been widely
applied to the study of the European Union over
the past two decades,with a particular emphasis
on the path-dependent development of the EU
and its policies. Scharpf’s (1988) pioneering
study of the ‘joint-decision trap’ in EU policy-
making, for example, demonstrated how, under
certain conditions of intergovernmentalism,
unanimity voting and a status-quo default con-
dition, inefficient EU policies such as the
Common Agricultural Policy could persist and
resist reform for extended periods. Similarly,
Pierson’s (1996) study of EU social policy
argued that EU member states had effectively
lost control of the policy, thanks to a combina-
tion of short time horizons, unintended conse-
quences, change-resistant decision rules and
policy adaptation by the beneficiaries of existing
EU policies. Generalizing from these studies,
we might hypothesize that, ceteris paribus,E U
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change (a) where their alteration requires a
unanimous agreement among member states or
the consent of supranational actors like the
Commission or the Parliament; and (b) where
existing EU policies mobilize cross-national
bases of support that raise the cost of reversing
or revising them.
By and large, however, these ‘first-generation’
historical institutionalist works have been more
effective in explaining continuity (often in the
face of exogenous shocks) than in explaining
endogenous change. For this reason, both ratio-
nal choice and historical institutionalists have
devoted increasing attention in recent years to the
challenge of theorizing endogenous sources of
change as well as stability.Within historical insti-
tutionalism,a growing ‘second-generation’litera-
ture has focused on the central claim that existing
institutions and policies may produce not only
positive feedbacks that stabilize and reinforce
existing equilibria, but also negative feedbacks
that create pressures for institutional and policy
change.Such feedbacks,it is argued,can produce
changes that are gradual in timing but ultimately
transformative in effect (Streeck and Thelen
2005; Hall and Thelen 2006; Immergut 2006).
Welfare-state programs, for example, may be
structured such that the value of benefits erodes
over time, and this benefit erosion in turn may
lead to a decline in public support for those
programs – a clear negative feedback in an issue-
area long characterized by the predominance of
positive feedback (Immergut 2006).
Within rational choice, the most concerted
effort to theorize endogenous sources of institu-
tional change has come from Greif and Laitin
(2004), who offer a model of endogenous
change that draws upon game-theoretic equilib-
rium models but introduces a dynamic theory
of institutional change. In a standard game-
theoretic model,the authors suggest,institutions
and their associated behaviors are endogenized
(explained),while the environmental context for
any given institution (say a given level of tech-
nology or the global economy or the global
balance of power) is theorized as an exogenous
set of ‘parameters’ that help to define the equi-
librium outcome within that institution. In this
context, however, it is possible that the workings
of an institution can in turn affect the value of its
parameters – or what Greif and Laitin call ‘quasi-
parameters’– which in turn may affect the inter-
nal equilibrium of the institution, either
reinforcing it or undermining it. Self-reinforcing
institutions, in this view, are those that change
the quasi-parameters of the institution so as to
make the institution and the individual behav-
iors of the actors within it more stable in the face
of exogenous changes. Self-undermining institu-
tions, in contrast, are those that change the
quasi-parameters such that a previously stable
equilibrium is undermined;these institutions,in
Greif and Laitin’s (2004: 34) terms,‘can cultivate
the seeds of their own demise’. Further develop-
ing Greif and Laitin’s ideas, Büthe (2006) has
suggested that the actions of the EU’s suprana-
tional agents can similarly be theorized as an
endogenous source of change, either reinforcing
or undermining the Union’s institutional and
policy equilibrium over the long term.
Despite their differences,both recent develop-
ments in historical institutionalism and Greif
and Laitin’s theory of endogenous change make
two central points: First, institutions may pro-
duce feedback effects that, over time, can lead to
change in the institution itself. Second, these
feedback effects may be positive, thus promoting
a reinforcement of institutionalized coopera-
tion, or they can be negative, undermining insti-
tutions and policies and possibly leading to their
demise. Existing studies of the EU – drawing
from theoretical sources including neofunction-
alism, historical institutionalism and construc-
tivism – have generally emphasized positive
feedback, in which an initial integrative act can
lead to functional spillover (Haas 1958), gaps in
member-state control (Pierson 1996; Pollack
2003), long-term socialization of elites (Haas
1958; Checkel 2005a) and the negotiation of
informal agreements that are subsequently codi-
fied over time (Farrell and Héritier 2005). The
notion that EU institutions might have negative
or self-undermining feedback effects has been
explored less systematically,
9 yet the Union’s
ongoing constitutional crisis and the long-term
decline in public support for further integration
suggest that negative feedback should be the
focus of greater attention in future studies of
institutional change.
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choice and other scholars should beware of the
temptation to ‘endogenize’ all sources of change
within a single theory or to attribute all change
within the European Union to positive or nega-
tive feedback effects from the EU itself. As
Immergut (2006: 6) aptly observes, ‘Although
exogenous change sounds like a fancy word for
an ad hoc explanation,there are many interesting
and systematic exogenous sources of change’.
Indeed, while scholars should be attentive to
possible feedback effects from European integra-
tion, it is both possible and likely that ‘exoge-
nous’ factors, including political and economic
changes on the world stage or critical elections
within one or more member countries, have
served and may continue to serve as the most
important sources of change in the EU, and that
the feedback effects of European integration
may be rare or weak compared with other
domestic and/or global sources of change.
CONCLUSIONS
There is an old expression to the effect that when
you have a hammer, every problem looks like a
nail.Critics of rational choice in EU studies have
often argued that formal modelers in particular
have approached the EU almost exclusively
through the lens of their off-the-shelf theories,
asking only narrow questions about those
aspects of the EU that resemble, say, domestic
legislatures or principal-agent relationships.
There is, I have argued in this chapter, some
truth to this claim: rational choice theorists have
followed a positive heuristic that has pointed
them toward the study of strategic interaction
within institutional constraints and away from
other questions such as socialization, delibera-
tion and identity change.
Nevertheless, the picture presented in this
chapter is broadly speaking a positive one, with
respect to both rational choice analysis and the
field of EU studies as a whole. With regard to
the former, we have seen how, over the past
several decades, students of the EU have adapted
rational choice theories of politics with increas-
ing sophistication to the myriad of specific
questions we can ask about European integration
and EU politics. Moreover, I have argued, the
empirical record of these theories has been, on
balance,positive and progressive,not pathologi-
cal. While we do find some evidence of elabo-
rate models subjected to cursory testing (or no
testing at all), the broader picture is one in
which scholars draw on rational choice theories
(and other theories) to generate testable
hypotheses about concrete political outcomes
across a range of subject areas.Even in areas that
have been considered to be outside the domain
of application of rational choice, such as
endogenous preference formation and change,
rational choice theories have (alongside con-
structivists) contributed to the development of
a sophisticated research program on EU social-
ization, as well as pioneering (alongside histori-
cal institutionalists) a revitalized discussion on
the endogenous sources of change in the EU.
Much remains to be done in these areas and the
work reviewed here is in many cases suggestive
rather than conclusive, but the claim that ratio-
nal choice is ‘ontologically blind’ to such ques-
tions has not been borne out.
With regard to the health of the field overall,it
is striking that the rational choice/constructivist
divide in EU studies, which many scholars
feared would descend into a metatheoretical
dialogue of the deaf, has instead proven healthy
to the field and to rationalist and constructivist
theorists on both sides of the divide. To a very
large extent,students of EU politics have taken a
pragmatic and problem-driven approach: iden-
tifying an important problem, searching the
existing literature (both rationalist and con-
structivist) for relevant insights and hypotheses
and seeking to test those hypotheses through
careful empirical analysis. This is the approach
taken in much of the literature on public opin-
ion, Europeanization, Eastern enlargement and
socialization, and the same approach should be
applicable to the full range of research questions
in EU studies.
The case for rational choice, finally, can be
made more forcefully. Thoughtful rational
choice theorists over the past decade have argued
that rational choice models should be most pow-
erful within a certain domain, in which the
stakes of individual decisions are considerable
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worthwhile), the informational context is rela-
tively rich (making calculation of expected util-
ity possible) and the rules of the game are clearly
and formally spelled out (Ferejohn and Satz
1996; Fiorina 1996). The European Union,
whether we call it an international regime or a
polity-in-the-making, has all of these character-
istics, suggesting that EU politics is a promising
forum for the elaboration and testing of rational
choice theories even beyond the core areas
explored in this chapter (Jupille 2004;Hix 2005).
Put differently, across the full range of its activi-
ties, EU politics does indeed look like a nail –
and we as a discipline would do well to get some
hammers.
NOTES
1.The author is grateful to Ben Rosamond and Knud Erik
Jorgensen for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
2. Rational choice, as Elster (1986) notes, is both a nor-
mative and a positive theory. In normative terms, rational
choice theory does not dictate the ends or aims to which
individuals should strive, but it does ‘tell us what we ought
to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible’.In con-
trast, rational choice as a positive theory adopts a particular
set of assumptions about actors and about their social con-
text and seeks to generate testable hypotheses about human
behavior. Despite the significance of the normative aspect, I
focus here on rational choice exclusively as a positive theory,
inquiring whether rational choice theories have advanced
our understanding of EU politics.
3.This is,of course,a severely compressed discussion of
a theoretical approach whose basic tenets remain to some
extent contested. For good discussions see e.g. Elster
(1986), Ferejohn (1991) and Snidal (2002).
4. The use of such models has been controversial, with
critics accusing modelers of simply restating in simplified
form basic insights already familiar to substantive experts
in the field. However, as Snidal (2002: 77–8) has argued,
formal models of collective action and international coop-
eration have produced non-intuitive or counter-intuitive
findings that went largely against dominant views and
generated specific predictions about both the obstacles
and the solutions to collective action problems. For good
discussions on the role of formal models in EU studies,see
e.g. Hug (2003) and Pahre (2005).
5. For a useful collection of responses to Green and
Shapiro’s critique, see e.g. the essays collected in Friedman
(1996b).
6. Foundational works in the RCI canon include Scharpf
(1988), Garrett (1992), Tsebelis (1994) and Garrett and
Tsebelis (1996). For useful reviews of institutionalism in EU
studies, see e.g. Jupille and Caporaso (1999), Dowding
(2000),Aspinwall and Schneider (2001) and Pollack (2004).
7.I am grateful to Andrew Moravcsik for suggesting the
empirical fruitfulness of rational choice theory as a central
focus of this chapter.
8. For an up-to-date study of the state of the art in the
study of the Council, see Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace
(2006); recent rationalist work on the Council that looks
beyond the voting-power approach includes Mattila and
Lane (2001), Mattila (2004) and the chapters in Thomson
et al. (2006).
9. Lindberg and Scheingold’s (1970) notion of ‘spillback’
is a notable,but underdeveloped and little-noted,exception.
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